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The Theory of Contrary Opinion:
A Test Using Sentiment Indices in
Futures Markets
Dwight R. Sanders, Scott H. Irwin, and
Raymond M. Leuthold
The theory of contrary opinion predicts price reversals following extremes in
market sentiment. This research tests a survey-based sentiment index’s usefulness
as a contrary indicator across 28 U.S. futures markets. Using rigorous time-series
tests, the sentiment index displays only a sporadic and marginal ability to predict
returns, and in those instances the pattern is one of return continuation—not
reversals. Therefore, futures traders who rely solely upon sentiment indices as
contrary indicators may be misguided.
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Market sentiment can be an invaluable tool when it comes to picking market
turning points. When sentiment readings reach an extreme it gives you an
alert to a possible turn in the market. It signals an imbalance in the market;
if 90% of traders are bullish at the end of the day, who is left to buy? The
futures market lends itself to be an ideal market for this type of analysis.
— Daily % Bullish, October 2000             
For many years, sentiment has been widely used as a contrary opinion indicator in
futures markets (Neill, 1960). Trading based on the “theory of contrary opinion”
generally is defined as taking a market position that is opposite of the prevailing
market opinion or psychology, and it is considered to be a “solidly logical” technical
approach to trading futures (Teweles and Jones, 1999, p. 179). Ironically, the popu-
larity of the approach has led to the development of survey-based sentiment indices,
which directly measure the level of agreement among a segment of market partici-
pants. When these sentiment indices reveal a “predominant number of market analysts
are bullish [bearish], it is quite likely that the market is approaching an overbought
[oversold] condition, and that a reversal in trend may be imminent” (Consensus, Inc.,
2001). As highlighted in the opening quote, futures traders frequently rely on
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sentiment indices as a measure of market opinion and use them to make trading
decisions under the theory of contrary opinion.
Market sentiment can be measured either indirectly through market-based senti-
ment indicators, or directly through surveys of market participants. An example of an
indirect, or market-based, measure of market sentiment is the put-call ratio: the total
trading volume in puts divided by the total trading volume in calls. Simon and Wiggins
(2001) refer to the put-call ratio as a “fear indicator.” When the ratio is at an extremely
high level, then market participants are more active in puts; thus, they are bearish or
fearful of a market decline. Under the theory of contrary opinion, this would portend
a market rally. An example of a direct, or survey-based, measure of market sentiment
is the Bullish Sentiment Index published by Investors Intelligence. This sentiment
index is based on a survey of stock market newsletter writers, and reflects the level of
agreement of the writers about the market outlook (Clarke and Statman, 1998). Under
the theory of contrary opinion, if a majority of newsletter writers are bullish, then the
market is overbought and it is expected to decline, and vice versa.
There is clearly a group of traders who think market sentiment is an important
indicator for predicting futures prices. Yet, despite its widespread use in futures
trading, few studies have examined the ability of sentiment measures to predict
futures market returns. Prior research generally has focused on stock markets (Solt
and Statman, 1988; Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Brown and Cliff, 2001). The limited
research on futures markets has relied on indirect measures of market sentiment
(Wang, 2001; Simon and Wiggins, 2001). There is an apparent gap in the literature
with regard to the usefulness of direct, or survey-based, sentiment indices as contrar-
ian indicators in futures markets. The purpose of this study is to test the predict-
ability of futures returns using a direct measure of market sentiment—the Consensus
Index of Bullish Market Opinion published by Consensus, Inc.
In addition to the use of a direct measure of sentiment, this research expands the
existing literature in three other ways. First, the research is comprehensive in that it
examines a total of 28 futures markets. Second, care is taken to fully investigate and
present the behavior of the sentiment indicators, the opinions they capture, and how
they are compiled. Third, a rigorous time-series methodology is employed to test the
relationship between the level of sentiment and the movement of subsequent futures
returns.
The following section reviews previous studies on the usefulness of sentiment in
predicting market returns. The next section introduces the Consensus Index of Bull-
ish Market Opinion and presents a thorough description of the data set. This is
followed by an explanation of the methodology and the results. The paper concludes
with a summary and discussion of the results and possible ramifications for aca-
demics and practitioners.
Previous Studies
Researchers who have examined the predictability of stock returns using market
sentiment have reported mixed results. Neal and Wheatley (1998) found that theSanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   41
1  It is not clear if the CFTC Commitment of Traders data represent a direct or indirect measure of market sentiment.
While these data are clearly not market-based, neither are they truly survey-based. Rather, the data are based on a pre-
defined classification system. Although actual positions are represented, the motivations for these positions, especially
among “hedgers,” is not known.
odd-lot ratio—an indirect measure of public participation in the market—does not
predict market returns. Similarly, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) found no evidence
that small investor sentiment, as measured by the discounts on closed-end funds, is
an important factor in the return generating process.
Solt and Statman (1988) examined the sentiment of retail stock investors as cap-
tured in the Bearish Sentiment Index compiled by Investors Intelligence. This is a
direct gauge of market sentiment which is constructed by surveying market news-
letters as to their outlook. Solt and Statman concluded that this market sentiment
index contains no useful information for forecasting market returns. Using the same
data set, Clarke and Statman (1998) confirmed the sentiment of newsletter writers
does not forecast equity returns, but past returns and market volatility do affect
sentiment.
Using measures of sentiment among Wall Street strategists (stock allocation
recommendations), newsletter writers (Bullish Sentiment Index), and individual
investors (AAII survey), Fisher and Statman (2000) found investor sentiment can
differ across groups. They show that the levels of sentiment among Wall Street
strategists and individual investors are reliable contrary indicators of market direc-
tion, but there is not a statistically significant forecasting relationship between the
Bullish Sentiment Index and the stock market. Fisher and Statman specifically
encourage additional research on market sentiment in other markets with other
sentiment measures.
Simon and Wiggins (2001) investigated the usefulness of market-based sentiment
indicators in the S&P 500 futures market. In their study, market sentiment is measured
with the volatility index (implied volatility from the S&P 100 index options), the
put-call ratio (total volume of puts divided by total volume of calls traded on the
S&P 100 options), and the trading index or TRIN (a scaled measure of number of
advancing stocks divided by the number of declining stocks). The authors found that
the sentiment indicators are statistically and economically useful contrarian indica-
tors in the S&P 500 futures market—i.e., a high level of bearishness or fear in the
stock market leads to subsequent positive returns in the S&P 500 futures.
Wang (2001) examined the impact of market participant sentiment in agricultural
futures markets using Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) Commit-
ment of Traders reports to gauge the sentiment of reporting noncommercials (large
speculators), reporting commercials (large hedgers), and nonreporting traders (small
traders).
1 Based on Wang’s findings, large speculator sentiment predicts price
continuation, large hedger sentiment predicts price reversals, and small trader
sentiment is not useful in predicting prices. However, the returns to large speculators
appear to be a premium for absorbing hedging pressure, and are not due to superior
forecasting skills.42   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
2  Consensus, Inc. acknowledges some interpretation is required for newsletters which do not explicitly make buy
or sell recommendations.
The research presented in the current study differs from and expands that of Simon
and Wiggins (2001) and Wang (2001) by utilizing a direct, or survey-based, measure
of sentiment. In a related line of research, Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold (2000) used
a survey-based measure of market sentiment (Market Vane’s Bullish Sentiment
Index) as a proxy for noise trader sentiment to directly test the predictions of a theo-
retical noise trader model. Here, a different sentiment index (the Consensus Index
of Bullish Market Opinion) is employed, and the focus is on testing the theory of
contrary opinion. Specifically, we address the question: Are survey-based sentiment
indices useful in predicting returns in futures markets?
Measuring Market Sentiment
The methodology used by Consensus, Inc. to compile its bullish sentiment index is
quite simple. Consensus, Inc. publishes a weekly market paper, CONSENSUS:
National Futures and Financial Weekly, containing a sampling of investment news-
letters. From the sample of letters Consensus, Inc. receives, it compiles a sentiment
index with a simple count of the number of bullish newsletters as a proportion of all
newsletters expressing an opinion. Consensus, Inc. considers only those opinions
committed to publication. The Consensus Bullish Sentiment Index at time t (CBSIt )
is expressed as:
CBSIt ' Number of Bullish Newsletters
Number of Newsletters Expressing an Opinion
.
For instance, if Consensus, Inc. receives 100 newsletters commenting on the frozen
pork bellies market, and 25 of those think that pork belly prices are going to increase,
then the CBSI is 0.25, or 25%.
2 The CBSI is compiled each Friday, reflecting the
opinions expressed in newsletters which are published during the week. It is released
early the following week by recorded telephone message and published in the fol-
lowing Friday’s edition of CONSENSUS.
Fisher and Statman (2000) note that the sentiment of different trading groups (e.g.,
Wall Street strategists versus individual investors) can provide distinctly different
market signals. Therefore, it is important to understand how indices are compiled,
the types of information used by survey participants, and the group of traders who
may be acting upon their advice. Here, we carefully examine these issues to aid in
our understanding of the data, to facilitate comparisons with other research, and to
assist in the interpretation of the results. Consensus, Inc. surveys newsletter writers
in futures markets. But, what information sources do the newsletter writers utilize
in forming their market opinions, and what group of traders is acting upon that
advice? A brief review of the decision-making rules of small traders and a sampling
of their information sources help address these questions.Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   43
In an early study, Smidt (1965) documented that most amateur speculators surveyed
preferred to trade commodities about which they had personal knowledge or advice.
Surveys by the Chicago Board of Trade and Barron’s have reported similar findings
(see also Nagy and Obenberger, 1994; Brennan, 1995). As summarized by Draper
(1985), the surveys suggest the average futures trader’s sources of information
include: articles/publications, broker and newsletter recommendations, advisory
services, and self-analysis. Consistent with these findings, Canoles et al.’s (1998)
survey of retail futures traders reveals their favorite sources of information are pro-
fessional trading advisory services and general financial publications. Collectively,
these results indicate retail speculators collect much of their information from
focused media sources, such as those surveyed by Consensus, Inc.
Based on the literature reviewed above, market advisors, brokers, and newsletters
provide decision-making information for retail futures speculators. But, how do
newsletter writers form their market opinion? Two excerpts from the February 17,
1995, issue of CONSENSUS: National Futures and Financial Weekly (Consensus,
Inc.) provide insight as to the information contained within advisors’ recommenda-
tions and market newsletters:
The major uptrending channel line is at 102-00 today. The strong close puts the
market in a strong position once again. The old main top at 102-29 was taken out.
This means that 101-08 is the new main bottom. Now that the (T-Bond) market has
closed inside of the uptrending channel the upside potential is 103-17. Long-term
swing chart is still projecting a rally to 103-26 by February 24th [contributed by
James A. Hyerczyk, Hyerczyk Technical Comments].
Each issue of CONSENSUS is filled with this type of technical commentary for nearly
every futures market. Many market advisors rely on technical indicators and simply
pass along this information to their retail subscribers. Although less common than
technical analysis, some newsletters are fundamental in nature, relaying government
reports, seasonal tendencies, and pertinent cash market conditions:
The USDA left the 1994S95 ending stocks of soybeans unchanged at 510 M.B.
which suggests that the market will not be as sensitive to weather as corn or
possibly wheat.... Seasonally, the market tends to bottom in late February and
work higher into March and May [contributed by Strickler, Bradford & Co., Inc.].
While the newsletters often contain detailed interpretations of relevant supply and
demand factors, the fundamental analysis tends to reiterate public information. In
aggregate, the surveyed newsletters seem to rely heavily on technical analysis, and
to a lesser degree on fundamental analysis, in forming their market opinions.
In summary, Consensus, Inc. surveys market newsletter writers, and retail specu-
lators appear to be the typical audience for this printed material. So, while the CBSI
reflects sentiment among newsletter writers, the information is likely acted upon by
retail speculators. This connection is consistent with the relatively high level of
correlation between newsletter writer sentiment and individual investor sentiment
reported by Fisher and Statman (2000) in stock markets.44   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
3  Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold (2000) present summary statistics for Market Vane’s sentiment indices. Correlation
results for the Market Vane and CBSI indices are available from the authors upon request.
4  More specifically, futures returns are matched to the date the CBSI is compiled, rather than the publication date.
There are two reasons why returns are matched to the compilation date. First, this minimizes “staleness” problems with
Consensus information. Second, the CBSI is published in two forms during the “release week” (the week that follows
the Friday date of compilation). In the early part of the “release week,” the CBSI is made available to subscribers by
recorded telephone message. On Friday of the “release week,” it is published in the weekly edition of CONSENSUS.
Hence, it is not possible to pinpoint a specific date that the CBSI is available to market participants.
The previous discussion indicates the CBSI is a valid direct, or survey-based,
measure of the market opinion of newsletter writers in futures markets. However,
there is some disagreement in the literature as to the applicability of survey-based
versus market-based measures of sentiment. Brown (1999) supports the use of direct
measures of market sentiment based on Occam’s Razor—the simpler the explana-
tion, the better. In contrast, Simon and Wiggins (2001) are critical of survey-based
measures because they may be “stale” by the time they reach publication, they tend
to equally weight respondents, and there is no accounting for the degree of bullish-
ness among respondents.
In the following analysis, the data sets are carefully aligned to avoid staleness
problems, yet at the same time not confounding correlation and causality among
sentiment and returns. Also, the CBSI is highly correlated with Market Vane’s
survey-based measure of market sentiment, which does use a weighting scheme based
on the degree of bullishness and the newsletter’s perceived influence.
3 Thus, the
CBSI appears to be an accurate and simple survey-based measure of market senti-
ment. In the following sections, we present the time-series data and methodology to
test if the CBSI is a useful contrary indicator in futures markets.
Data
Futures Data and Markets
Weekly futures returns are calculated for the closest to expiration contract where the
maturity month has not been entered. The time series of futures returns are created
to match up with the sentiment data. Specifically, nearby contract returns are calcu-
lated on a Friday-to-Friday basis using closing prices. The return series corresponds
to the Friday compilation of the Consensus, Inc. sentiment data.
4 Returns (Rt) are
calculated as the continuously compounded change in closing prices, ln(pt/pt!1).
Weekly data from May 1983 through September 1994 are available, but 54 weeks
are withheld for potential out-of-sample testing, which results in 536 observations.
A cross-section of 28 U.S. futures markets is examined to avoid erroneous impli-
cations based on the nuances of a particular market. Markets are chosen based on the
availability of the futures and sentiment data. To facilitate the presentation of results
and for relevant comparisons, related markets are designated into groups. Group
classification is based on common production/consumption patterns and expectations
concerning the correlation of returns and sentiment among the markets. The fiveSanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   45
Table 1. Summary Statistics, Consensus Bullish Sentiment Index (May 1983S S S S
September 1994)
Market
 a Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Correlation
 b
Grain:
   Corn 45.701 19.916  5 92 0.289
   Wheat 46.413 20.193  3 91 0.295
   Soybeans 46.783 17.882 12  90 0.278
   Soybean Meal 42.501 20.012  5 95 0.347
   Soybean Oil 43.992 21.861  5 96 0.323
Livestock:
   Live Cattle 51.584 15.547 15  87 0.319
   Feeder Cattle 46.998 19.617  6 95 0.374
   Live Hogs 44.332 15.696 13  88 0.289
   Pork Bellies 39.716 17.913  4 88 0.335
Food/Fiber:
   Coffee 43.992 20.906  5 96 0.286
   Sugar 51.279 22.112  5 94 0.279
   Cocoa 41.755 20.455  4 94 0.223
   Orange Juice 40.294 22.731  6 94 0.363
   Cotton 45.981 21.331  7 96 0.321
   Lumber 42.181 21.033  5 94 0.328
Financial:
   Deutsche Mark 46.876 21.822  4 89 0.316
   Swiss Franc 45.205 21.739  3 94 0.301
   Japanese Yen 42.701 20.821  3 91 0.312
   British Pound 42.870 22.017  0 96 0.273
   Canadian Dollar 41.591 19.899  0 92 0.326
   Treasury Bills 46.619 20.917  5 93 0.233
   Treasury Bonds 44.406 17.525  9 86 0.274
Metal/Energy:
   Gold 43.570 20.630  3 96 0.233
   Silver 43.531 19.254  4 95 0.203
   Platinum 44.450 21.641  6 95 0.264
   Heating Oil 39.679 20.469  4 87 0.270
   Crude Oil 40.401 18.471  3 86 0.300
   Gasoline 38.551 20.674  5 93 0.313
a All of the markets have 591 weekly observations, except crude oil and gasoline, which begin in April 1985 and
have 494 observations.
b The contemporaneous correlation coefficient between market returns and sentiment. The standard error of the
estimated correlations is (1/(n – 3))
½, so with n = 591, the standard error is 0.04123, and any correlation coefficient
greater than 0.0809 (0.106) is statistically different from zero at the 5% (1%) level using a two-tailed t-test.
groups include: grain (corn, wheat, soybeans, soybean meal, and soybean oil); live-
stock (live cattle, feeder cattle, live hogs, and frozen pork bellies); food/fiber (coffee,
sugar, cocoa, orange juice, cotton, and lumber); financial (Deutsche mark, Swiss franc,
Japanese yen, British pound, Canadian dollar, Treasury bills, and Treasury bonds);
and metal/energy (gold, silver, platinum, heating oil, crude oil, and gasoline). A
complete listing of markets and their summary statistics are reported in table 1.46   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
Figure 1. Consensus Bullish Sentiment Index, coffee 
(May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)
Summary Statistics
It is necessary to examine the simple summary statistics to fully understand the data
and to motivate the time-series approach used in the analysis. The general character-
istics of the sentiment indices are explored with simple summary statistics presented
in table 1. The mean sentiment level (% bullish) is notably less than a neutral 50 for
the CBSI. In fact, the mean CBSI is statistically less than 50 at the 1% level (two-
tailed t-test) for all the markets except live cattle and sugar. The range of the mean
CBSI is from a low of 38.6 for gasoline to a high of 51.6 for live cattle.
For all markets, sentiment is quite volatile, with large standard deviations and
extremes of above 90 and below 10. The extreme values of sentiment along with its
volatility may suggest the newsletter writers who make up the indices are reacting
to correlated market signals. As an illustration of the sentiment behavior over time,
the CBSI for coffee is plotted in figure 1.
The last column of table 1 shows the contemporaneous correlation coefficient
between returns and sentiment. The largest correlation is 0.374 for feeder cattle and
the lowest is 0.203 for silver. It is noteworthy that the correlations are all signifi-
cantly positive at the 1% level (two-tailed t-test). Newsletter opinions collected during
the week are positively correlated with market returns during the same week. There-
fore, using contemporaneous sentiment and returns in the time-series analysis could
result in the erroneous conclusion that sentiment “causes” returns, when in fact just
the opposite may be true. This would be a classic example of confusing correlation
with causality.Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   47
5  Note, misspecification of equation (1) due to cointegration and an omitted error-correction term is not a problem
with these data as sentiment is clearly stationary I(0) in levels.
6  The causality test assumes that the two series, ρt and Rt, are covariance stationary, and et is an i.i.d. white noise
error. This assumption is tested using White’s general test for heteroskedasticity in the error term. If et is heteroske-
dastic, then the model is reestimated using White’s heteroskedastic consistent covariance estimator, and the appropriate
test for the parameter restrictions is a Wald Chi-squared test (Greene, 1993, p. 392). A Lagrange multiplier test is used
to verify that the residuals are serially uncorrelated. If, after choosing the optimal lag length, the residuals demonstrate
autocorrelation, then additional lags of the dependent variable are added as explanatory variables [i.e., p is increased
in equation (1)] until the autocorrelation is eliminated.
Table 2 presents the simple contemporaneous correlation coefficients for senti-
ment and futures returns across related markets. Not surprisingly, sentiment among
related commodities is highly correlated. Looking at panel A (grain), a correlation
of 0.631 indicates that when newsletter writers are bullish about corn, they are also
bullish about the price of soybeans. Likewise, in panel D (financial), newsletter
writers tend to have similar sentiment about the price of the various currencies versus
the U.S. dollar. These correlations are consistent with common decision-making
factors among newsletter writers. Note, however, the correlation among sentiment
indices is much lower in relatively unrelated markets, such as those in the food/fiber
group in panel C.
Generally speaking, within closely related market groups, the level of correlation
among sentiment indices is comparable to the correlation of futures returns across the
same markets (lower diagonal entries in table 2). The relatively strong levels of corre-
lation among both the returns and sentiment within designated market groups help to
motivate and justify the pooling procedures implemented in the following sections.
Methodology and Results
Market Sentiment and Returns 
Understanding the behavior of sentiment is important in examining its usefulness as
a market indicator. A general method of exploring the linear linkages between senti-
ment and price is the “Granger causality” framework. To assure the time-series tests
for return predictability are properly specified, it is important to test for causal
linkages in both directions. Hamilton (1994, p. 302) suggests the following direct,
or bivariate, Granger test:







where ρt and Rt represent noise trader sentiment and futures returns, respectively, and
et is a white noise error term.
Causality from returns to sentiment in equation (1) is tested under the null of
bj = 0, œj. Specifically, equation (1) is estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS),
and the null hypothesis that Rt does not lead ρt is tested with a Chi-squared test
(Hamilton, 1994, p. 305).
5,6 The aggregate sign of causality is addressed by summing48   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 2. Correlation Matrices, Sentiment and Futures Returns Across
Markets (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)
[The upper off-diagonal entries are correlations for Consensus sentiment; the lower off-diagonal
entries are correlations among futures returns.]
PANEL A. GRAIN
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Market Corn Wheat Soybeans Soybean Meal Soybean Oil
Corn 0.472 0.631 0.481 0.549
Wheat 0.467 0.387 0.335 0.352
Soybeans 0.691 0.362 0.692 0.693
Soybean Meal 0.594 0.314 0.868 0.332
Soybean Oil 0.575 0.319 0.776 0.461
PANEL B. LIVESTOCK
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Market Live Cattle Feeder Cattle Live Hogs Pork Bellies
Live Cattle 0.673 0.470 0.268
Feeder Cattle 0.812 0.315 0.180
Live Hogs 0.440 0.369 0.654
Pork Bellies 0.245 0.231 0.597
PANEL C. FOOD/FIBER
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Market Coffee Sugar Cocoa Orange Juice Cotton Lumber
Coffee 0.005 0.249 0.023 0.102 0.049
Sugar 0.013 0.062 0.037 0.073 0.069
Cocoa 0.159 0.060 0.006 0.046 !0.017  
Orange Juice !0.055   0.008 0.039 !0.072   !0.021  
Cotton !0.012   0.041 0.094 !0.069   0.217


















Deutsche Mark 0.916 0.613 0.774 0.299 0.168 0.259
Swiss Franc 0.947 0.605 0.789 0.288 0.135 0.186
Japanese Yen 0.646 0.650 0.591 0.286 0.181 0.126
British Pound 0.769 0.775 0.488 0.331 0.134 0.152
Canadian Dollar 0.079 0.084 0.047 0.159 0.046 0.191
Treasury Bills 0.136 0.125 0.063 0.098 0.054 0.627
Treasury Bonds 0.101 0.081 0.031 0.047 0.048 0.682
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Table 2. Continued
[The upper off-diagonal entries are correlations for Consensus sentiment; the lower off-diagonal
entries are correlations among futures returns.]
PANEL E. METAL/ENERGY
Simple Correlation Coefficients
Market Gold Silver Platinum Heating Oil Crude Oil Gasoline
Gold 0.700 0.611 0.101 0.087 !0.081  
Silver 0.734 0.653 0.059 0.032 0.024
Platinum 0.692 0.625 0.086 0.122 0.068
Heating Oil 0.284 0.156 0.187 0.762 0.634
Crude Oil 0.287 0.164 0.185 0.887 0.751
Gasoline 0.267 0.134 0.187 0.839 0.872
Notes: The correlations are calculated over 591 observations, except for those using crude oil and gasoline
data, which begin April 5, 1985, and have 494 observations. The standard error of the estimated correlations
is (1/(n – 3))
½, so with n = 591, the standard error is 0.04123, and any correlation coefficient greater than
0.0809 (0.106) is statistically different from zero at the 5% (1%) level using a two-tailed t-test.
the impact of lagged returns, Σbj, and testing if it equals zero using a two-tailed
t-test. If Σbj > 0, then market sentiment is an increasing function of past prices.
Choosing the appropriate lag lengths (p, q) is of practical significance in
performing the causality test (see Thorton and Batten, 1985; Jones, 1989). As
suggested by Beveridge and Oickle (1994), the order of an autoregressive system
may be best determined by searching all possible lags for the combination that
minimizes a model selection criterion. For example, in (1) the model is estimated by
varying the own-lag length of ρt from p = 1, 2, ..., p
max, and the lag length of Rt from
q = 1, 2, ..., q
max, such that a total of (p
max × q
max) regressions are estimated. The p, q
lag length combination that minimizes Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) is
chosen as the final model specification. This purely objective procedure has the ad-
vantage of not placing the artificial restriction that p = q. Additionally, it eliminates
the uncertainty in multivariate cases of deciding the order in which to enter additional
variables into a model. For equation (1), all possible lag-length combinations are
estimated with p
max = q
max = 8, and p, q is chosen to minimize AIC.
The estimation results for each market are presented in table 3. The results indicate
market returns lead sentiment and the cumulative impact is positive. In each market
examined, the null hypothesis that returns do not lead sentiment is rejected at the
0.01 level. The additive effect of lagged returns is statistically positive (1% level)
for every market in the data set. Past returns and sentiment levels explain a fairly
large portion of the variation in sentiment, with the adjusted R
2 ranging from 0.531
(feeder cattle) to 0.795 (gold) in the CBSI models. These results are consistent with
prior work on sentiment (Solt and Statman, 1988; De Bondt, 1993) and conjectures
that newsletter writers are often trend-followers (Clarke and Statman, 1998).
For a more general characterization of market opinion, the causality test in (1) is
estimated by pooling the time-series data across the designated futures groups. The50   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 3. Granger Causality Test for Individual Futures Markets, Returns
Lead Sentiment (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)












  Corn 1,2 39.56 0.000 152.6 4.94 0.000 0.761
  Wheat 1,1 63.83 0.000 140.7 7.98 0.000 0.741
  Soybeans 2,2 23.70 0.000 135.3 4.17 0.000 0.701
  Soybean Meal 1,2 42.64 0.000 172.9 5.45 0.000 0.658
  Soybean Oil 2,2 45.70 0.000 178.5 6.29 0.000 0.653
Livestock:
  Live Cattle 1,6 73.92 0.000 424.3 5.67 0.000 0.608
  Feeder Cattle 4,1 43.17 0.000 266.1 6.57 0.000 0.531
  Live Hogs 2,2 89.65 0.000 183.8 3.96 0.000 0.675
  Pork Bellies 2,3 54.17 0.000   79.3 3.96 0.000 0.630
Food/Fiber:
  Coffee 3,3 92.76 0.000 211.7 7.65 0.000 0.652
  Sugar 3,2 60.91 0.000   90.2 6.75 0.000 0.782
  Cocoa 2,2 81.92 0.000 175.2 7.64 0.000 0.631
  Orange Juice 5,2 37.82 0.000 175.6 5.71 0.000 0.693
  Cotton 5,2 68.17 0.000 215.8 6.75 0.000 0.715
  Lumber 1,2 63.92 0.000 155.6 6.52 0.000 0.608
Financial:
  Deutsche Mark 2,2 97.44 0.000 379.8 7.23 0.000 0.759
  Swiss Franc 2,3 100.50   0.000 460.7 7.42 0.000 0.769
  Japanese Yen 1,5 73.15 0.000 685.8 6.47 0.000 0.745
  British Pound 4,3 81.07 0.000 466.3 6.52 0.000 0.759
  Canadian Dollar 3,2 59.12 0.000 917.5 6.84 0.000 0.688
  Treasury Bills 4,1 66.43 0.000 219.4 8.15 0.000 0.679
  Treasury Bonds 4,2 106.30   0.000 388.3 8.22 0.000 0.727
Metal/Energy:
  Gold 2,2 71.74 0.000 282.5 7.59 0.000 0.795
  Silver 4,6 98.77 0.000 201.8 4.71 0.000 0.709
  Platinum 2,2 73.41 0.000 213.4 7.91 0.000 0.703
  Heating Oil 1,1 51.06 0.000   89.4 7.14 0.000 0.645
  Crude Oil 4,1 40.55 0.000   65.5 6.36 0.000 0.683
  Gasoline 4,2 30.15 0.000 119.2 5.03 0.000 0.587
Notes: The model is estimated with OLS, and the Wald χ
2 statistic tests the null, H0: bj = 0, œ j. The cumulative
impact of returns is calculated, Σbj, and tested against the null, H0: Σbj = 0, with a two-tailed t-test. All models
are estimated over 536 weekly observations, except for those involving crude oil and gasoline, which are esti-
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7  Implicitly, it is assumed sentiment is endogenous and impacted by an exogenous shock to returns.
8  The one standard deviation shocks to weekly returns (in parentheses) for each group are as follows: grain (0.029),
livestock (0.029), food/fiber (0.042), financial (0.013), and metal/energy (0.036).
9  The impulse response functions decline toward their long-run or total multiplier which is zero, as is the case for
any stationary series.
pooled cross-sectional time-series models are estimated using the generalized least
squares (GLS) procedure of Kmenta (1986, pp. 616S635) correcting for cross-
sectional correlation and heteroskedasticity. The lag lengths for the pooled regres-
sions are specified by choosing the maximum p and the maximum q from among the
individual market specifications within each group. For instance, in the grain group,
the maximum p is 2 (soybeans and soy oil) and the maximum q is 2 (corn, soybeans,
soy meal, and soy oil); therefore, the pooled grain model’s lag structure is 2,2. While
this specification procedure may overspecify lag structures at the expense of statis-
tical power, it assures the model does not suffer from an underspecification bias.
The estimated pooled models are presented in table 4. For each pooled regression,
the null hypothesis that returns do not lead sentiment (i.e., bj = 0, œj) is tested with
a Wald Chi-squared test, and the cumulative impact of lagged returns is again tested
with a two-tailed t-test (i.e., Σbj = 0). Certain important characteristics of sentiment
are evident in the results. First, across groups, sentiment follows a fairly strong
positive autoregressive process, with first-order coefficients around 0.65. Second,
a statistically significant positive relationship between sentiment and returns is
demonstrated at one- and two-week lags for all the groups. For instance, in grains,
a 1% weekly return results in sentiment increasing by 1.26% the following week and
0.376% the week after that. For all the groups, the null that returns do not lead senti-
ment can be rejected at the 1% level, and the cumulative impact of lagged returns
is significantly positive (1% level).
To illustrate the behavior of sentiment, the impulse response function for a one
standard deviation shock to returns is calculated (see Harvey, 1991, p. 234).
7 The
graphs in figure 2 show the impulse response functions for the pooled sentiment
models. This figure reveals that a one standard deviation shock in weekly returns
causes the greatest initial increase in food/fiber market sentiment (panel C).
8 Notably,
the impact on metal/energy (panel E) and financial (panel D) market sentiment does
not reach a peak until two weeks after the initial shock. All of the response functions
decline rather smoothly and at similar rates, except for the livestock group (panel B)
where extrapolative effects are less pronounced.
9 In total, the pooled models strongly
suggest the sentiment levels are caused by returns, and newsletter writers in aggregate
may be trend-followers. These results are consistent with those documented by Solt
and Statman (1988) and De Bondt (1993) for retail stock market speculators.
Based on the presented results, two points are clear. First, any test of market senti-
ment’s usefulness as a contrary market indicator must be careful to include only past
values of sentiment to avoid the contemporaneous correlations documented in table
1. Second, given the strong evidence that returns lead sentiment, a regression-based
predictive model which does not include past returns is potentially misspecified.
Therefore, Granger’s causality test that sentiment leads returns is a natural extension52   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
Table 4. Granger Causality Test for Pooled Futures Market Groups, Returns
Lead Sentiment (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)
Independent Market Group




























































































Rt!6 — !4.67  
(!0.58) 
















[q] 221.6 143.9 368.7 364.6 202.7
Buse’s R
2 0.667 0.545 0.683 0.671 0.653
Note: The t-statistics (in parentheses) test if the coefficient equals zero, with degrees of freedom equal to
N(K – (p + q + 1), where N = 536 (438 for metal/energy) and K = number of markets in the group.
a All the  statistics reject that the coefficients on lagged returns are zero at the 1% level. χ
2
[q]
of the work presented thus far, and it is an appropriately specified time-series test for
sentiment’s value as a contrary indicator.
Tests for Return Predictability
Two different time-series tests of return predictability are employed. The first is
a general test based on a Granger causality specification parallel to that presented in
equation (1). The second is a more specialized test of contrary opinion based on the
market-timing framework developed by Cumby and Modest (1987).Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   53
Figure 2. Impulse response functions for futures market groups,
return impact on market sentiment (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)54   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
Causality Tests
Following the specification and estimation procedures presented for equation (1), the
linear linkages between returns and sentiment are examined using the bivariate
Granger test:







where Rt and ρt are futures returns and noise trader sentiment, respectively, and gt is
a white noise error term. Sentiment leads returns in equation (2) if market sentiment
is useful in predicting returns, and it is tested under the null of βj = 0, œj. Further-
more, the cumulative impact of market sentiment on returns is tested under the null
of Σβ j = 0. Rational expectations is also tested under the full orthogonality condition:
βj = αi = 0, œi, j. Again, to increase the power of these tests, they are estimated over
pooled cross-sectional time-series data using the futures groups presented in table 1.
Equation (2) provides a well-specified and general means of testing the orthogon-
ality condition implied by market rationality. If, however, sentiment is a useful con-
trary indicator for market returns, then there will be a negative relationship between
sentiment and returns—i.e., high (low) sentiment predicts negative (positive) returns.
A contrarian relationship should be captured in (2) by finding that sentiment leads
returns βj … 0, œj, and the cumulative impact of sentiment on returns is negative
(Σβ j < 0). The opposite is true for a positive impact (βj … 0, œj, and Σβ j > 0).
The causality test results for individual markets are presented in table 5. The first
χ
2 statistic (column 3) tests the null that sentiment does not lead returns, and the
t-statistic (column 5) tests if the sum of lagged sentiment coefficients equals zero.
The second χ
2 statistic (column 6) tests the full orthogonality condition. The first
result of importance is that lagged sentiment did not even enter 14 of the 28 regres-
sion models. For the remaining models, the null hypothesis that sentiment does not
lead returns is rejected for two markets (lumber and Treasury bills) at the 5% level,
and four more markets (feeder cattle, cocoa, orange juice, and live hogs) at the 10%
level. The total of six rejections is more than would be expected by chance alone
(0.10 × 28 = 2.8 rejections).
While there is some evidence of a relationship between sentiment and subsequent
futures returns, the direction of the relationship is not consistent. Trade sources
(e.g., CONSENSUS) tout sentiment as a contrary indicator, but the t-statistics for H0:
Σβ j = 0 reveal that the sum of lagged sentiment coefficients is not consistently
negative. The sum is significantly negative in only two cases (live hogs and cocoa).
Further, nine of the 14 t-statistics are positive, indicating a tendency toward continu-
ation instead of reversal.
The second χ
2 statistic (column 6) in table 5 tests the null hypothesis that neither
sentiment nor past returns lead future returns, i.e., returns are not predictable with
the information contained in past returns and sentiment. This null is rejected in 13
markets at the 10% level or higher. Of the 13 rejections, eight are in markets where
the first χ
2 test did not reject the null, and the rejections are concentrated among theSanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   55
Table 5. Granger Causality Test for Individual Futures Markets, Sentiment
Leads Returns (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)







[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]  [8]







  Corn 5,0 — — — 5.72     0.334 0.017
  Wheat 0,1  0.17 0.679 !0.41     0.17     0.679 !0.001
  Soybeans 3,1  2.30 0.129 !1.51     4.82     0.306 0.008
  Soybean Meal 3,0 — — —       4.31     0.230 0.009
  Soybean Oil 3,0 — — —       3.45     0.327 0.010
Livestock:
  Live Cattle 6,0 — — —       11.95     0.063 0.015
  Feeder Cattle 2,3  7.48 0.058 0.76     10.61     0.059 0.017
  Live Hogs 1,3  6.39 0.094 !2.05     17.13     0.002 0.024
  Pork Bellies 1,0 — — —       0.72     0.393 !0.001
Food/Fiber:
  Coffee 1,0 — — —       0.22     0.638 !0.002
  Sugar 0,1  2.11 0.146 1.45     2.11     0.146 0.002
  Cocoa 0,1  3.21 0.073 !1.79     3.21     0.073 0.004
  Orange Juice 1,5 10.32  0.066 2.62     31.69     0.000 0.041
  Cotton 4,0 — — —       12.69     0.012 0.028
  Lumber 2,2 18.68  0.000 !0.49     25.24     0.000 0.059
Financial:
  Deutsche Mark 0,1  1.21 0.271 1.09     1.21     0.271 0.000
  Swiss Franc 3,0 — — —       6.19     0.102 0.009
  Japanese Yen 0,1  2.16 0.141 1.47     2.16     0.141 0.002
  British Pound 3,0 — — —       6.86     0.076 0.009
  Canadian Dollar 0,1  0.53 0.462 0.73     0.53     0.462 !0.001
  Treasury Bills 0,5 16.86  0.005 0.06     16.86     0.005 0.015
  Treasury Bonds 1,0 — — —       0.64     0.422 !0.001
Metal/Energy:
  Gold 0,1  0.31 0.574 0.56     0.31     0.574 !0.001
  Silver 6,0 — — —       9.32     0.156 0.016
  Platinum 6,1  2.55 0.111 1.59     13.72     0.056 0.015
  Heating Oil 3,0 — — —       8.96     0.029 0.022
  Crude Oil 3,0 — — —       6.79     0.078 0.013
  Gasoline 3,0 — — —       8.77     0.032 0.025
Notes: The model is estimated with OLS, and the first Wald χ
2 statistic (column 3) tests the null, H0: βj = 0,
œ j. The t-statistic tests that the sum of the lagged sentiment coefficients equals zero, Σβ j = 0. The second χ
2
statistic (column 6) tests full orthogonality, H0: αi = 0 and βj = 0, œ i, j. The model is estimated over 536
weekly observations, except for those regressions involving crude oil and gasoline, which have 438 obser-
vations.56   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
10  The individual models were also estimated in a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) framework, but the results
were not materially different from the OLS estimations.
Table 6. Granger Causality Test for Pooled Futures Market Groups, Senti-
ment Leads Returns (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)
Independent Market Group, Coefficient × 10
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2 0.006 0.001 0.009 0.002 0.006
Notes: The t-statistics (in parentheses) test if the coefficient equals zero, with degrees of freedom equal to
N(K – (m + n + 1), where N = 536 (438 for metal/energy) and K = number of markets in the group. The first
(second) χ
2 statistic tests H0: βj = 0 (and αi = 0), œ i, j [with p-values in brackets].
food/fiber and metal/energy groups. Although not presented, in the markets where
the full orthogonality null is rejected, the rejection primarily stems from low-order
positive autocorrelation in returns.
The pooled causality results are presented in table 6. Pooled models were estimated
with Kmenta’s cross-sectionally correlated and heteroskedastic GLS procedure.
10Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   57
11  The sum of lagged sentiment coefficients is not significantly different from zero for the food/fiber group.
Figure 3. Impulse response function for the food/fiber market group,
market sentiment impact on return (May 1983S S S SSeptember 1994)
The first χ
2 statistic (with p-values in brackets) tests the null that sentiment does not
lead returns, and the second χ
2 statistic tests the full orthogonality condition. The
null hypothesis that sentiment does not lead returns is rejected for the food/fiber
group only. The full orthogonality null hypothesis is rejected at conventional levels
for all groups except livestock. Returns in general, and the food/fiber and grain
groups in particular, are characterized by positive autocorrelation at short lags with
autoregressive parameters along the order of 0.05 to 0.07 in magnitude.
As with the individual market models, the direction of sentiment’s impact on
returns is somewhat inconsistent. For example, the food/fiber group’s sentiment
coefficients are significantly negative at lag one and significantly positive at lags
two and five.
11 The full impulse response to a one standard deviation shock to weekly
sentiment is plotted in figure 3 for the food/fiber group. The figure shows there is
not a well-defined response structure for sentiment leading returns. That is, the
response function takes both positive and negative values before converging to zero
after seven weeks.
Collectively, the causality models provide some mild evidence that newsletter
sentiment is useful in predicting market returns. However, the null hypothesis is
rejected in a relatively small number of the markets. Furthermore, the direction of
sentiment’s impact is not consistent across markets. The small amount of evidence
which does exist would suggest price continuation over weekly intervals, not price
reversals. This evidence is not supportive of using sentiment as a contrary indicator.58   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
12  The OLS error terms are tested for heteroskedasticity using White’s test, and for autocorrelation using the
Lagrange multiplier test. If the errors are heteroskedastic, then the model is estimated using White’s heteroskedastic
consistent covariance estimator, and if the errors are autocorrelated, then the Newey-West covariance estimator is
utilized (Hamilton, 1994, p. 281).
However, the findings are consistent with those reported by Wang (2001) for CFTC
small speculators in agricultural futures markets.
Cumby-Modest Test
While the causality test results presented above do not indicate a consistent relation-
ship between noise trader sentiment and subsequent futures price movements, it may
be possible that a relationship exists, but only at extreme levels of sentiment
(CONSENSUS; Wang, 2001). The market-timing framework proposed by Cumby
and Modest (1987) can be used to determine whether extreme sentiment readings
provide market signals. Given a definition of extremely high and low sentiment levels
(KH and KL, respectively), the Cumby-Modest (C-M) test is based on the following
OLS regression:
(3) Rt ' α % β1HIt&1 % β2LOt&1 % gt,
where HIt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 > KH, and HIt!1 = 0 otherwise; LOt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 < KL, and
LOt!1 = 0 otherwise. If the mean return conditioned on extreme optimism (α + β1) or
pessimism (α + β2) is different from the unconditional mean (α), then timing ability
is demonstrated. The null hypothesis of no predictability, H0: β1 = β2 = 0, is tested
against the alternative of significant timing ability, HA: β1 … 0 or β2 … 0. “Contrary
opinion” would suggest that β1 < 0 or β2 > 0, indicating extreme sentiment is nega-
tively related to returns.
Consensus, Inc. suggests that sentiment outside the range of (25,75) denotes a
market approaching extreme conditions. For the initial C-M tests, extreme sentiment
is defined by these levels plus a factor of five to assure that the extremes compose
a small percentage of the total observations. The C-M test results for individual
markets with KH = 80 and KL = 20 are presented in table 7.
12 For individual markets,
the number of extreme observations constitutes from 4.3% (23) to 30% (161) of the
536 total observations for each market. Based on χ
2 statistics, the null hypothesis of
no timing ability (β1 = β2 = 0) is rejected for three markets (live cattle, Canadian
dollar, gasoline) at the 5% level and two more markets (soybeans, cocoa) at the
10% level. Again, the five rejections are more than would be expected by chance
(0.10 × 28 = 2.8 rejections). There also are four cases where an individual coefficient
is significantly different from zero (β2 for wheat, Japanese yen, platinum, and crude
oil), but the joint test is insignificant. Finally, it is worth noting that only one of the
rejections (cocoa) is common to both the C-M and causality tests.
While there is evidence of a significant relationship between extreme sentiment
and returns, the direction of the relationship is, if anything, one of continuation.Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   59
Table 7. Cumby-Modest Test for Individual Futures Markets (May 1983S S S S
September 1994)
Equation (3) Cumby-Modest regression: Rt ' α % β1HIt&1 % β2LOt&1 % gt
Market
Extreme
Observations α × 10
!2 β1 × 10
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13  In the text, the C-M coefficients are always referred to as the change in returns or expected percentage price
change, relative to the unconditional return. This is in contrast to the total expected return. For instance, when the





Observations α × 10
!2 β1 × 10












































































Notes: The model is estimated with OLS, where HIt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 > KH, and HIt!1 = 0 otherwise; LOt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 < KL,
and LOt!1 = 0 otherwise; and KH = 80, KL = 20. Values in parentheses are t-statistics, and the Chi-squared test is a
joint test of the null, H0: β1 = β2 = 0. All models are estimated over 536 weekly observations, except for those
involving crude oil and gasoline, which are estimated over 438 observations.
Returns increase (decrease) after high (low) sentiment, rather than reverse. In addi-
tion, there is variation in the coefficient signs for those markets where the null is
rejected. For instance, if the CBSI is below 20, then the following week nearby live
cattle returns increase by 2.07% on average, while Canadian dollar returns fall
0.188%.
13
Pooled C-M test results with KH = 80 and KL = 20 are presented in panel B of
table 8. The pooled C-M models are estimated using Kmenta’s cross-sectionally
correlated, heteroskedastic, and timewise autoregressive GLS estimation technique.
Of the five market groups, the null of no market timing is rejected at the 5% level
for the grains and at the 10% level for the financials. For example, the estimated
coefficients show weekly grain futures returns increase by 0.4029% after sentimentSanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   61
Table 8. Cumby-Modest Test for Pooled Futures Market Groups (May 1983S S S S
September 1994)
Equation (3) Cumby-Modest regression: Rt ' α % β1HIt&1 % β2LOt&1 % gt
PANEL A.  KH = 75,  KL = 25
Group α × 10
!2 β1 × 10







































PANEL B.  KH = 80,  KL = 20
Group α × 10
!2 β1 × 10







































PANEL C.  KH = 85,  KL = 15
Group α × 10
!2 β1 × 10







































Notes: The model is estimated over N cross-sections and T time-series observations, where HIt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 > KH,
and HIt!1 = 0 otherwise; LOt!1 = 1 if ρt!1 < KL, and LOt!1 = 0 otherwise. The t-statistics (in parentheses) test that
parameter values are zero, and the χ
2 tests the joint null, H0: β1 = β2 = 0. All models are estimated over 536 weekly
observations, except the metal/energy group, which is estimated over 438 observations. Each pooled regression
has N × T cross-sectional time-series observations, where T = 536 (or 438) and N is the number of markets
comprising the group.62   Spring 2003 Journal of Agribusiness
14  While these returns are statistically significant, their economic significance is debatable. It is not the intent of
this study to search for an economically significant trading strategy. Instead, we are simply investigating the time-
series predictability of returns.
readings above 80%, and increase by 0.0689% after sentiment readings below
20%.
14
Parameter sensitivity is explored by altering the definition of extreme sentiment.
In panel A of table 8, KH = 75 and KL = 25, while in panel C, KH = 85 and KL = 15.
At decreased extremes (panel A), the grain model still displays statistically signifi-
cant timing ability, but when the extreme sentiment definitions are widened (panel
C), none of the pooled models reject the null hypothesis. These results suggest that
the impact of market sentiment is quite sensitive to alternative definitions of extreme
index values.
Overall, the C-M test results indicate some evidence of a predictive relationship
between extreme sentiment and subsequent futures returns. The evidence is strongest
for grain futures markets. However, the relationship is indicated for only a limited
number of the markets, it is sensitive to the definition of “extreme” sentiment, and
the direction of extreme sentiment’s impact generally is that of continuation. These
results do not support the use of the sentiment index as a contrary market indicator,
even at extreme levels. The tenuous causal relationships between sentiment and
returns are consistent with Fisher and Statman’s (2000) results for newsletter writers
in equity markets and Wang’s (2001) findings for CFTC small speculators in agri-
cultural futures.
Summary and Conclusions
The theory of contrary opinion predicts price reversals following extremes in market
sentiment. This analysis tests return predictability in futures markets using a direct,
or survey-based, measure of sentiment. Findings show the Consensus Index of
Bullish Market Opinion primarily reflects the opinions of newsletter writers and the
corresponding market positions of their primary audience—retail futures speculators.
The lead-lag relationships between sentiment and futures market returns are investi-
gated within a Granger causality framework. The results suggest that sentiment is
an increasing function of past futures returns over at least the previous two weeks,
and retail futures speculators may be trend-followers who act in unison to correlated
market signals (past returns). This characterization is consistent with the theoretical
“noise traders” of De Long et al. (1990a,b), and the results can have ramifications
for interpreting and testing noise trader models (Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold, 2000).
In this research, market sentiment is found to have little predictive power in futures
markets. Time-series regressions (Granger causality tests) are specified to test if the
level of noise trader sentiment consistently predicts subsequent futures price move-
ments. The predictive ability of extremely high or low sentiment is also tested in a
Cumby-Modest (1987) market-timing framework. The time-series regressions provide
some evidence that noise trader sentiment is useful in predicting market returns,Sanders, Irwin, and Leuthold The Theory of Contrary Opinion   63
particularly when sentiment is at extreme levels. However, relationships are present
for only a limited number of the markets, and the direction of sentiment’s impact
generally is inconsistent. The relationship, if any, tends toward continuation.
Specifically, there is little or no evidence supporting market reversals or “contrary
opinion.” This conclusion is fairly consistent across the 28 futures markets examined.
Therefore, practitioners who rely solely on this type of indicator may be misguided.
The results may also provide interpretive evidence for different theoretical models
which suggest sentiment can influence market returns (e.g., Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers, 1989; Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998).
This research focuses on one sentiment index, the Consensus Index of Bullish
Market Opinion, which reflects the sentiment of market newsletters. As pointed out
by Fisher and Statman (2000), the results could vary using the sentiment of another
segment of market participants (see also Wang, 2001). Likewise, sentiment could
impact other aspects of price behavior, such as volatility. We concur with Fisher and
Statman that this line of research needs to be broadened to additional markets, alter-
native forms of price behavior, and other measures of sentiment.
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